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Abstract 
Today s financial industry is fundamentally based on information technology. Most companies, espe-
cially banks, run data warehouses to achieve an integrated view on their whole business. These finan-
cial data warehouses have to cope with very different kinds of information provided by each business 
unit. As banking product portfolios are subject to frequent changes and warehouse requirements are 
enhanced permanently due to supervisory guidelines and internal reporting needs, data warehouse 
projects have to master various challenges over time. In order to obtain resilience, the organizational 
structure of data warehouse projects has to be aligned to team members roles, skills and required 
communication channels. We describe how communication problems can be identified by using the 
Viable System Model and examine how communication between project stakeholders influenced a pro-
ject in an exemplary case study. We illustrate that the management of financial data warehouse pro-
jects has to deal with complex problems of knowledge transfer due to a gap of mutual understanding 
between project members from business and IT departments. 
Keywords: Project Management, Viable System Model, Financial Data Warehousing, Organization, 
Communication. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As organizations invest greatly in information technology (IT) in order to improve their operational 
and strategic position, information systems (IS) play an ever-increasing role in today s organizations 
and society (Laudon and Laudon 2005, p. 7). The interaction between IT and organization is very 
complex and influenced by many mediating factors, including the organization s structure, standard 
operating procedures, politics, culture, environment and management decisions (Laudon and Laudon 
2005, p. 77). Banks are especially affected by these changes due to the nature of their marketable 
products, which are mainly immaterial. Consequently, the production process of a bank mainly con-
sists of information processing, and IT has become one of the main factors of production in banking 
(Guo, Tang, Tong and Yang 2006). In order to cope with complexity, IS are often developed in the 
form of structured approaches (Hirschheim, Klein and Lyytinen 1995, p. 33). Projects are a structured 
set of activities concerned with delivering a defined capability to an organization based on agreed 
schedule and budget (Ribbers and Schoo 2002, p. 45). Complex IS development projects (ISDPs) are 
large scale projects with a significant and complex software component (BCS 2004, p. 7; Xia and Lee 
2005). ISDPs are inherently complex because they must deal with both the technological issues and 
also the organizational factors that, by and large, are outside of the project team s control (Xia and Lee 
2005, p. 46). Consequently, the complexity of IS development manifests itself in the high failure rate 
of ISDPs (BCS 2004; SGI 2001). But despite ongoing research into e. g. ISDP complexity (Xia and 
Lee 2005), the role of escalation in ISDPs (Keil 1995; Keil, Mann and Rai 2000) and project manage-
ment in general (Kuntz, Christiansen, Cohen, Jin and Levitt 1998; Levitt 2004), there has not been 
much interest in the role of communication and coordination for ISDP success. 
In this paper, we examine the organizational impact of the communication behaviour on project suc-
cess in a large implementation project within the European financial industry. Especially large banking 
groups with foreign subsidiaries have to deal with new regulatory demands, e. g. Basel II, IFRS or 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, one of the leading Austrian banks put up a multi-million dollar data 
warehouse ISDP together with a consulting company in order to fulfil the Basel II requirements speci-
fied by the local banking supervision authorities. Because the necessary adjustments influenced not 
only IS but also changed the daily business, all departments of the bank were involved in this project. 
The presented case is typical for recent projects in the financial sector. In addition, as the bank was in 
a post-merger situation and was the target of an acquisition during the project, the ongoing consolida-
tion process in the banking industry is considered as well. In this context, the following questions were 
of special interest for our research: 
What information and communication problems did occur in the ISDP and what actions were taken 
to overcome these obstacles? 
Which are the major points of conflict with regard to communication within the ISDP? 
How should we organize internal communication and what kinds of communication should be used 
to become more effective within ISDPs? 
In order to develop a better understanding of the organization of a large ISDP and the demands for the 
involved managers and employees, we examine the explicit predetermined information and communi-
cation channels (e. g., meetings, requirements specifications and reports), but also take a look at in-
formal communication behaviour, using additional information from project members. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The theoretical base for the research is discussed 
in the second section covering literature contribution. In addition, to conceptualize the organizational 
setting at the Austrian bank, we introduce the Viable System Model. Within the third section of the 
paper, the case is introduced. The fourth section of the paper applies and analyzes the case study in 
terms of the Viable System Model. We show why the Viable System Model is appropriate for analyz-
ing communication problems and information channels within organizations. The final section sum-
marizes the findings of the paper and draws conclusions for the research. 
2 RELATED WORK 
2.1 Information Systems Development Projects 
There are a lot of reasons for data warehouse projects to fail, when risks become problems (Adelman 
and Moss 2001) and known success factors are not met (Hwang, Ku, Yen and Cheng 2004; Wixom 
and Watson 2001). For example, one of the main tasks in data warehousing is to keep the ETL (extrac-
tion, transformation and loading) process running. Looking at the overall costs of a data warehouse 
project, the costs incurred by the ETL process have a major share (Kimball and Caserta 2004). The 
maintenance of the interfaces, transformations and load processes needs high-skilled employees capa-
ble of a lot of knowledge regarding the companies system environment, business needs and general 
data warehouse skills. This demand is a major problem for companies: data warehouse specialists are 
high-skilled and expensive professionals. A lot of companies cannot or do not want to afford an ex-
pensive specialist over time. On the other hand it is also quiet problematic to depend on a single spe-
cialist regarding such a vital system. Obviously, there must be a transfer of knowledge in order to edu-
cate other employees in tasks that are needed for daily data warehouse maintenance. 
In the end a data warehouse project is a special ISDP project. With regard to communication, accord-
ing to Keil et al. (2000), escalation occurs in ISDPs especially if negative information and bad news 
are ignored or downplayed. Following Montealegre and Keil (2000), the de-escalation process that 
follows such behaviour is a complex, emergent process in which solutions emerge as managers begin 
to understand the problems. While de-escalation is an important process for already troubled projects, 
research should try to help ISDPs to avoid factors that ultimately lead to problems and escalation. 
There are a couple of factors influencing successful IS implementations (Yeo 2002). Although the 
necessary knowledge transfer between project members is identified as a relevant part of the software 
development process (Levina and Vaast 2005; Robillard 1999), the organizational impact of commu-
nication is not subject to recent research. The field in-between knowledge transfer, communication 
and organization needs further research regarding implementation projects. The relevant questions are 
closely related to boundary spanning (Aldrich and Herker 1977), i. e. boundary spanners bridge busi-
ness and IT departments (Pawlowski and Robey 2004). Consequently, the focus of our research lies on 
the needed communication in given organizational structures of ISDPs to satisfy the observation that 
projects have to cope with given organizational boundaries. 
2.2 The Viable System Model 
ISDPs can be analyzed by using many different lenses and points of view. For our research, we em-
ploy a systemic perspective and regard ISDPs as complex systems. Conant and Ashby (1970) made 
the point that in order to regulate (control) a system well, the regulator must work through a model of 
that system; and a model of a system must model every salient aspect or interesting feature of that sys-
tem. In fact, this is a restatement of Ashby s Law of Requisite Variety: only variety destroys variety 
(Ashby 1964, p. 207). Variety is the number of possible states of a system and therefore a subjective 
measure for complexity. Following the Conant-Ashby-Theorem and the Law of Requisite Variety, for 
a system (e. g., an IDSP) to remain regulated (controlled), it is vital that the controlling element (the 
management) has as much variety as the element it is to control. Consequently, from a systemic point 
of view, the evaluation of management practices, information systems, and information and communi-
cation channels respectively 
 
all of them serving as variety attenuators and amplifiers becomes of 
great importance for management to adjust variety accordingly. Each information channel is a two-
way communication loop of variety attenuators and amplifiers. Attenuators and amplifiers need to be 
designed; when they are not designed, they simply occur because Ashby s Law asserts itself (Beer 
1979, p. 92). 
In order to model and analyze the information channels of an ISDP and to provide a rigorous theory 
for backup, we propose to apply the Viable System Model (VSM) (Beer 1979; Beer 1981; Beer 1985). 
According to Beer (1985, pp. 1-16), the VSM specifies the minimum functional criteria by which a 
given system (e. g., a company, an organization, or a project) can be said to be capable of independent 
existence. The VSM has its roots in cybernetics and describes the necessary organizational structure 
that is needed for a system to survive in a constantly changing environment. It consist of six main 
components (cf. Table 1), or sub-systems, and a set of information channels between the sub-systems. 
The essential principle for structuring within the VSM is based on recursion: each sub-system needs 
the same structure as the whole system, each level of organization is a recursion of its super-system 
(Beer 1979, p. 68). A system is viable if it is able to maintain its configuration over some time. 
The VSM has been previously applied in various research approaches in management science 
(e. g., Espejo and Harnden 1989; Jackson 2000). In information systems research, the VSM has been 
used especially in the context of information systems development (e. g., Kawalek and Wastell 1999; 
Vidgen 1998). From our point of view, the VSM serves as an underlying theory in order to map the 
necessary information channels within a project management team, and therefore helps in the process 
of building a model for controlling and managing the framework of interaction (Britton and Parker 
1993). By applying the VSM in our case study, we demonstrate why the VSM is appropriate for mod-
elling information channels and communication within project management teams.  
System Description 
System 1 On each given recursive level, Operational Divisions are responsible for certain parts of an or-
ganization s activities and have contact to the outside environment. The divisions are each 
managed by a divisional Management Unit. Together, they form an Elemental Organizational 
Unit. All Operational Divisions and divisional Management Units on one level of recursion 
together form System 1 (Beer 1979, pp. 94-97). 
System 2 Each System 2 conducts a service function for System 1 (e. g. Finance, Human Resources or IT 
services), and serves to damp oscillation and disruptions that occur between the divisions on an 
operational level (Beer 1979, pp. 176-186). 
System 3 System 3 supervises all internal operational activities of all divisions from a higher point of 
view of the total system. It optimizes the allocation of resources, assigns them to the divisions 
and regularly checks the use of these resources (Beer 1979, pp. 473-480). 
System 3* System 3* is the audit channel, which gives System 3 direct access to the state of affairs in the 
operational activities. System 3 can obtain immediate information by using System 3*, instead 
of relying on information passed to it by divisional management. 
System 4 System 4 deals with the diagnosis of the long-term connection of a viable system to its outside 
environment and its adaptation to future trends (Beer 1979, pp. 235-240).  
System 5 The ethos of the whole viable system is formed by System 5. It embodies supreme values, rules 
and norms for the stabilization of the whole system (Beer 1979, pp. 259-264). 
Table 1.  Components of a Viable System Model 
3 FINANCIAL DATA WAREHOUSING  A CASE STUDY 
3.1 Research Approach and Data Collection 
The overriding concern of our approach is that the research we undertake should be both relevant to 
the research questions, as set out in the introduction, and rigorous in its implementation. Following 
this, we focused on how the information systems and information and communication channels at the 
bank actually worked in practice. In order to satisfy these objectives, we engaged into a case study. 
From our point of view, it is rather unlikely that a researcher is able to study a phenomenon in its envi-
ronment in-depth by only measuring it without any impact on the phenomenon itself. Walsham (1995, 
p. 77) notes that the researcher in interpretivist case studies can either take the idealistic role of an 
outside observer or that of an involved researcher . Even if a researcher views him- or herself as an 
outside observer, he or she is in some sense acting by influencing what is happening in the domain of 
action, if only by the sharing of concepts and interpretations with the other actors in the case study 
site. Therefore, the conducted case study can be described as an action case study (Hughes and 
Wood-Harper 1999). 
Since one of the authors was involved as a consultant in a large financial data warehouse project 
(working as a project field leader of this project), we had full access to all operational processes, in-
formation systems, documents and reports of this project. Some of the actions mentioned in this paper 
were influenced by the author s decisions in the project. In addition, we had complete access to all 
project documents, project managers and team members of all project stakeholders. We approved our 
observations by open interviews with other involved team members to gather information from differ-
ent points of view. Administrative documents (organization diagrams, the project handbook, project 
plans with estimated budgets, timelines and assigned employees), work descriptions (self-recordings 
of manager activities), print-outs of project reports from various points in time, interview transcripts 
and field notes of the researchers were collected in a case study diary (Yin 2003). The collection of the 
case study data was started in 2007 after the involved author left the management position. The idea to 
apply the VSM for the interpretation of the project was formed afterwards. We applied the VSM as a 
theory for matching our interpreted data in order to derive causes of the observed problems and suc-
cesses. The development of the VSM was the responsibility of one of the authors who reflected on the 
obtained and interpreted information. The other author provided feedback and critique on the model. 
3.2 Case Description 
The case study is based on an intensive implementation project that took place in 2006 and 2007 in a 
large Austrian bank. The trigger for this project was the supervisory requirements known as Basel II. 
These regulations demand specified risk calculation and risk treatment processes that have an impact 
on the whole structure of a bank. As these were developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision until 2005 and have slightly adopted been released as an EU directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC in June 2006, they became law in Austria in 2007. Beside the Basel II project, another 
large project was established in the same bank. A new major operational system, intended for daily use 
for most of the bank s employees, was developed and switched productive during the second half of 
2006. So nearly every department was involved in two large and important projects at the same time 
while doing the normal daily work as well. The whole value chain of the bank was touched and partly 
redesigned. From operational systems over the central group-wide data warehouse to the reporting and 
supervisory systems, nearly every IS was affected. 
One major task of the project was to extend the existing data warehouse by detailed data from foreign 
subsidiaries, to achieve a group-wide view on risk details according to Basel II regulations. Because 
some of the small foreign subsidiaries only had a few employees, the project staffing was a challeng-
ing task for the management. In the end of 2005, the bank decided to take a Basel-II-experienced con-
sulting company as leader into the project and found zeb/ as partner. Within two years, the remaining 
tasks counting over 40,000 person-days of work had to be fulfilled. Higher management positions 
where staffed simultaneously by a bank employee and a consultancy manager, to assure that the whole 
project knowledge remains within the bank after the project has ended and to reach transparency 
throughout the whole implementation of Basel II. A changing environment partly disturbed the pro-
ject. Inquiries of the supervising authority made demands on the employees time. Moreover, a further 
acquisition process stressed the bank s staff. 
The project organization needs a few clarifying words. Because the realization of Basel II is a large 
venture, the management of the bank talks about a program instead of a project. Projects are the 
smallest organizational units within the program. They are let by project bundles, while project bun-
dles themselves are managed by project fields. These fields are subordinated to the overall project 
management, which itself is controlled by the program management team. By this organizational 
structure, about 500 single projects within the program for Basel II were supervised (cf. Table 2). 
While there were a couple of small projects, these little projects where combined by the responsible 
project manager of the bank if possible. 
Management Unit Subordinated Unit Subunits Person-days 
program management team overall project management 1 40,000 
overall project management project field management 8 40,000 
project field management project bundle management from 4 to 5 from 400 to 14,000 
project bundle management single project management from 2 to 95 from 130 to 5,300 
single project management project team members from 2 to >25 from 1 to 1,100 
Table 2.  Hierarchical Order and Size of Management Units 
Project fields were managed by project field leaders (PFL). The main relevant project fields (PF) for 
the case were the PF Business Division, the PF IT Department and the PF Subsidiaries. The partition-
ing into these project fields matched the bank s organization in order to keep a familiar environment 
for the bank s employees known from their daily business and other projects. Project bundles were 
arranged regarding business topics, i. e. Rating and Scoring, Credit Risk, Group Management, Data 
Management and Roll Out Management. The data warehouse releases containing the efforts for the 
ETL process where positioned within a project bundle of the PF IT Department. 
To handle this large program, spending a peak of 550 person-days per week, the overall project man-
agement introduced standard project procedures for the lower management levels to be able to con-
solidate project progress information and keep the program controllable. An important task for every 
project manager in the beginning of a single project was to negotiate the tasks, timelines and budget 
with the project bundle management and the project team. Due to the size of the program, the weekly 
progress reporting was embedded in a reporting procedure based on the bank s mailing and groupware 
system. The different project levels (field, bundle etc.) discussed the reports, actual problems and 
taken actions in regular management meetings lasting about one hour. In addition, managers had to 
conduct operational work to handle emerging problems. This extra time needed for troubleshooting 
was planned explicitly. Accordingly, the management job was scheduled for two days a week for each 
manager, and the rest of the week was initially reserved for this operational work. 
3.3 Case Analysis 
In the following, we employ the VSM to exemplarily sketch and interpret the main findings for ISDP 
management for the case study. Figure 1 sketches the resulting VSM. At the top right part the Program 
Management Unit is placed, which consists of the Overall Project Management and the Program Man-
agement Team. The managers of this unit were in charge of the whole program and came from the top 
management level of the involved parties. On the left side of Figure 1, the environment of the organi-
zation is shown, being in direct interaction with the organizational units. The main focus lies on the 
project fields mapped in the centre. Within a project field, the project bundles are plotted, building a 
recursive interface within the VSM. The sub-systems of the first recursion level are labelled in capi-
talization (e. g., System 3 as THREE , the overall project management), whereas the second level of 
recursion uses numbers (e. g., System 3 as 3 , the PFLs). Communication channels between the units 
are illustrated by directed arrows. The most important channels are transmitting via Systems 2 and 3* 
as well as the alarm channel. They allow communication between the different recursion levels. 
The main part of project activity comprised the time period from March 2006 to the middle of 2007. 
The introduced multi-project organization had to deal with a lot of projects running at the same time 
and having wide spread interdependencies. In the later stages of the project, the organizational struc-
ture shrunk with the tasks. The project bundle leaders had to control a couple of projects at a time. As 
project bundle leaders organizationally belong to a project field, there were different project bundle 
leaders responsible for different phases of the data warehouse development process. Requirements 
were gathered by the Business Division, while the responsible manager of the IT Department trans-
ferred the business requirements to release-specific technical requirements. To ensure a comprehen-
sive information flow on management level between Business Division, IT Department and other in-
volved units (e. g. Systems ONE), the same person was nominated for the role of the project bundle 
leader by the consultancy (acting as Management Unit on the second recursion level). In our inter-
views, project bundle leaders from both bank and consultancy mentioned problems with the planned 
information channels between Business Division and IT Department: 
Skilled business employees were busy.
 
(22/03/2007, project bundle leader of the bank and 
team member in the data warehouse project) 
[In the beginning] there was no transparent communication between business division and 
IT.  (24/10/2007, project bundle leader of the consultancy) 
Due to high work load in management tasks, sight was lost of the important information channel be-
tween business employees and IS developers. The high workload resulted from circumstances external 
to the project but influencing the project staffing, and requiring permanent replanning, tracking of re-
sources and quality of work. Caused by non-project activities, a couple of times the staffing of bank 
employees had to be adopted by the managers, which added more tasks to the position than calculated 
upfront. As there was no formal specification of a permanent direct communication between Business 
Division and IT Department pertaining to requirements, the exchange of conceptual modelling ideas 
over time was not really taking place. In addition, business view feedback was given mostly in an in-
dividual style: 
Contents of a release were harmonized by a bunch of emails. (24/10/2007, project bundle 
leader of the consultancy) 
Each responsible employee worked slightly different. [...] The cleared release plan had to be 
changed due to late requirement changes.  (22/03/2007, project bundle leader of the bank and 
team member in the data warehouse project) 
As a result, there were late requirement changes, which led from human resource shortage to loss of 
functionality and reduced time for documentation. There were only four employees having insight into 
the data warehouse from a business point of view. Their task was to design the new releases. After the 
first release, the PF management of the IT Department insisted on explicit deadlines for business re-
quirements and direct involvement of the Business Division (realizing the need of an explicit System 
TWO on the first recursion level to coordinate Systems ONE). 
Having a look on the project organization visualized in Figure 1, it becomes clear that there was no 
direct formal information channel between PB1-n in Business Division and PB1-n in IT Department. 
As the final responsibility for arrangements between Business Division and IT Department lay in the 
hands of the PFLs using System TWO, but communication between the project bundle leaders was 
needed, there was an intensive use of the operational linkages between Business Division and IT De-
partment. As all software products developed within the Basel II program had direct or indirect con-
nections to the group data warehouse (gDWH), all data requirements showed up in one of four gDWH 
releases of the program. As there was no person in the Business Division who had a complete over-
view of the gDWH requirements, the project bundle leaders (Systems 3) were forced to spend much 
time on coordinative tasks that belong to System TWO, and which were not scheduled. As such, they 
played a major role in actual requirements engineering and indirectly secured user participation by 
being part of both Systems ONE. Although the major advantage of the project organization was a di-
rect fit to the banks division structure, the observed communication and coordination problems were 
evident. 
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Figure 1. VSM of the projects relevant parts (before March 2007) 
In order to give an example for the measurement of the resulting complexity for coordination and 
communication tasks, we refer back to the concept of variety. Variety is not an intrinsic property of 
the system, but rather depends on how the observer defines the system (Ashby 1964, p. 125). If differ-
ent observers of a system distinguish the states or elements of the system differently, then they will 
come to different measures of variety of the system. But for a concrete case, the abstract concept of 
variety must be transformed into an applicable and useful measure (Rivett 1977, p. 37). For example, 
the amount of time of a manager can be considered. Assuming that a manager has a limited variety, 
this bound on communication capacity limits the coordination capacity of the units under the supervi-
sion of the manager (Bar-Yam 2004, p. 41). For instance, Table 3 shows planned and observed man-
agement activities of the consultancy project bundle leaders in an ordinary week, showing that the 
non-scheduled extra time was mostly due to coordination tasks. Consequently, using time as an activ-
ity-based measure, we can conclude that the variety for the project bundle leaders was proliferating. 
 Activity Planned hours per week Observed hours per week 
Meetings 9.5 
Project bundle management 
20 
27 
+16,5 
Operational tasks and meetings 18 11 -7 
Other tasks (ways etc.) 2 3.5 +1,5 
Total 40 51 +11 
Table 3. Actual Activities of an Exemplary Project Bundle Leader 
Therefore, a crucial point for project success was the decision to place the same consultancy managers 
in the leader role of all project bundles of the same business topic. In that they acted as boundary 
spanners and substituted direct user participation. As an informal System TWO, they fulfilled the im-
portant job of coordinating work in the separate Systems ONE, although this took more coordinative 
work than was originally expected (cf. Table 3). By this, the communication between the project bun-
dles working on the same topics in different development steps was assured. In March 2007, the bank 
decided to create a single point of contact (SPOC) in the Business Division to collect requirements and 
be the central contact person for all subdivisions. Obviously, the subjective need for a central coordi-
native contact regarding gDWH requirements (System TWO) existed within the organizational struc-
ture. The interpretation of the organizational structure with the help of the VSM gave evidence for this 
missing information channel and the resulting suboptimal distribution of tasks. 
The formal gDWH project goals were specified by the project field management as 1) business re-
quirement documents, 2) a software product and 3) a technical documentation. Project participants 
tried to at least fulfil all of these in pragmatic ways, because there was no time to discuss documenta-
tion contents deeply. The documents were read, interpreted and implemented by the IS developers 
having only little discussion with the business division. The following example clarifies this behaviour 
and resulting problems due to lack of communication. One requirement was to calculate the group-
wide exposure of a customer within the ETL process. The business requirements did not cope with 
technical issues like inactive or closed deals which were needed for other analysis in gDWH. Having 
these additional deals within the calculation, the runtime of the gDWH had become unacceptable. 
Consequently, the responsible business employee and IT manager were directed to form a task force to 
solve the situation together. It took only a few hours to reduce the relevant amount of deals for the cal-
culation to a half, which brought the runtime back in line. The business employee had no chance to 
consider this case upfront since technical knowledge was required: 
A transparent communication process has been implemented by pressure of project field 
management and project bundle management, which led to better results in the last releases.
(24/10/2007, data warehouse project manager of the consultancy) 
In the middle of 2007, the project structure was changed to a more content-oriented structure. The pro-
ject bundle leaders became PFLs with responsibility for Business Division, IT Department and Sub-
sidiaries (System ONE). By this arrangement, they now officially became responsible for the coordi-
native communication tasks of System TWO as well. 
4 DISCUSSION 
The main focus was on the ETL process which caused the largest expenses of about 60% within the 
data warehouse project. As the data warehouse in a first version already existed before the project had 
started, every change within the operational systems or in the data warehouse data model had impact 
on the ETL process. To develop a correct interface between an operational system as a data source and 
the data warehouse as a data consumer, the business departments and data warehouse developers have 
to agree about the business needs and the technical design of the ETL process. This agreement can 
only be reached by communication. This essentially is why the information channels of the surround-
ing organizational structure are that important. The main problems within the case can be put down to 
information channel defects and coordinative communication problems as shown in Table 4. There 
were a couple of problems having their roots in missing reconcilement between business requirements 
and technical design. The subjective business view judged the requirement documents as ready for 
implementation , while the subjective technical view often interpreted the requirements in a com-
pletely different direction. As a formal anti-oscillatory structure (System TWO) was missing, the pro-
ject bundle leaders were forced to solve these issues with non-scheduled discussions. An inter-
subjective understanding had to be built with high costs between all stakeholders. 
Problem Part of VSM Actions taken 
Destaffing of project members Systems 1 Replanning of resources  
Underestimated communication efforts for 
project bundle leaders 
Systems ONE Project bundle leaders activities were shifted 
towards coordinative management tasks 
No direct communication channel between 
Business Division and IT Department 
System TWO Overall program management installed the same 
consultant for a topic in each project field 
Late requirement changes and incomplete 
requirements discussion; no standards for 
communication 
System TWO PFL IT defined clear processes for requirements 
analysis between Business Division and IT; 
installation of SPOC to tie communication 
Table 4. Summary of problems and actions linked to the VSM 
Requirement documents were needed to document the inter-subjective requirements, which became a 
contract between the business division as a principal and the IS implementation team as an agent. One 
finding of this case is that complex requirements cannot be written down without communication be-
tween business departments and IT departments. From a more radical point of view, requirements for 
complex IS always need to be discussed by all relevant stakeholders to enable a successful implemen-
tation. The observed ISDP s organizational structure failed in having a participative systems develop-
ment approach: the users were involved in systems development, but did not take control of the proc-
ess (Hirschheim et al. 1995, p. 36). Consequently, systems development was not viewed jointly as a 
social and technical process, which needs focusing on both the technical and the business issues. Up to 
a certain point, this could be substituted by an emerging System TWO: the project bundle leaders of 
the consultancy, acting in a dual role in both PFs of business and IT. Organizational structures in 
ISDPs need to explicitly take the mutual communication into account by providing official informa-
tion channels and Systems TWO. 
A solution for the described problem is to implant a boundary spanner who has knowledge of both 
business and IT, as was the case with the PBL of the consultancy. Theoretically, this solves the prob-
lem, but the practical problem is that such high-skilled employees might be very expensive and do not 
automatically lead to a stable, reusable solution. When the specialist leaves the company, documenta-
tion is needed for the remaining employees or successors. Again a knowledge transfer is needed at that 
point in time, having to cope with the same problems as encountered during the implementation pro-
ject. The underlying problem of requirements communication is that there is no common language in 
use that can handle all requirements in a formal way. On the other hand, the case shows that as of to-
day it is not efficient to formalize, document and specify as much as you can ex ante by only one side 
of the requirements team. Requirements need to be based on broad inter-subjective understanding in 
order to be manageable with small expense. A problem exists with finding the right trade-off between 
how much more formalization is useful juxtaposed to direct speech-based communication and discus-
sion. An ISDP s organizational structure explicitly has to take this into account. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we introduced the VSM as an effective explanation model for communication-oriented 
organizational analysis on implementation projects in financial data warehousing. In a case study we 
showed how the organizational design of information channels can significantly affect project per-
formance when building ETL processes. Every ISDP has to deal with implementing the business re-
quirements correctly. For financial data warehousing projects the ETL process contains great com-
plexity which leads to more complex requirements. To collect these requirements, direct communica-
tion is needed. The impact on project organization is a need for explicit provision of coordinative in-
formation channels and jointly developed requirements by both business and IT departments. 
In examining contributions of this research to ISDP management, we can conclude that from a practi-
cal perspective the VSM offers a suitable language for analyzing information and communication 
problems of complex ISDPs in detail. From a theoretical perspective, the VSM acts as a framework for 
identifying points of conflict and for actions to be taken to overcome those conflicts. This serves as a 
first building block for knowledge on assessing the quality of an ISDP s organizational structure. If 
sound ISDP management is among the desired goals, practitioners may benefit from our insights on 
what kind of activities strengthen the relationship between ISDP organizational structure and ISDP 
success. 
However, we like to point out that our study has several limitations. Our interpretation is not a valida-
tion of the relationship between the structure of the VSM and successful ISDP management. Since we 
examined only one single case for the single domain of financial data warehouses in detail, the find-
ings need to be tested in cross-case analyses. Another suggestion is to apply the VSM in an action re-
search approach. In the setup phase of an ISDP the organizational structure is determined by the roles 
and positions of the project. The know-how, skills and personality of team members filling these roles 
and positions influence the necessary intensity of information channel usage. We believe that team 
member allocation and the explicit design of information channels for communication are important 
prerequisites for successful financial data warehousing. But the process of working on business re-
quirements and technical design still contains unexplained behaviors of involved actors. In further re-
search, we want to develop a deeper understanding of how efficiency considerations make stake-
holders believe that a sufficient level of knowledge transfer between team members is reached or not. 
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